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Key Points: 
 
• On July 1 the United Kingdom assumed the Presidency of the European Union for the 
duration of six months. It did so in a volatile political atmosphere with the European Union at 
an important crossroads. 
• Whereas the official agenda focuses largely on continuing economic reform as well as on 
external matters, the UK government faces an unavoidable agenda which has largely written 
itself. Key issues will be the future of the Constitutional Treaty, Future Financing and 
Enlargement.  
• The terrorist attacks of 7 July in London are likely to result in an increased focus on EU wide 
co1operation in combating international terrorism, in particular with respect to retention of 
telecommunications data. 
• Though the short1term future of the Treaty has been agreed upon following the Summit, 
neither the European Council nor the UK government have a clear1cut and purposeful 
strategy for dealing with the issue in the long–term. However, the UK government does not 
seem to expect the matter to dominate the Presidency in concrete terms largely due to the 
preponderance of more pressing issues. 
• The most pressing issue will be that of future financing. One likely strategy for the UK 
government will be to avoid an escalation of the issue by securing a budget which, crucially, 
will be subject to a mid1term review around 2008. The government would thus temporarily 
hold on to the rebate but secure a review of the Common Agricultural Policy significantly 
earlier than that scheduled for 2012. 
• The scheduled enlargement of 2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, is not 
under threat. The most controversial issue will be the opening of accession talks with Turkey, 
particularly in light of likely German opposition. However, tension is defused by the long1
term nature of Turkish EU membership. 
• Recent UK government rhetoric has stressed the need for Europe to reconnect with its 
citizens. One benchmark by which to judge the UK EU Presidency will be the extent to which 
the government can trigger and sustain a debate on the core questions of European 
integration. 
• A flavour of the prospective tone of such a debate was offered by Prime Minister Blair in his 
speech to the European Parliament of June 23. Social justice, as well as economic prosperity, 
lies at the heart of both EU and UK politics. It is unlikely, however, that the UK EU Presidency 
will see a stream of concrete policy initiatives. Rather, the focus will be on long1standing 
problems and sources of tensions that have troubled the European Union.  
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Background 
On 1 July 2005 the UK assumed the Presidency of the EU taking on the role from Luxembourg, 
before being succeeded by Austria on 1 January 2006. The UK takes up the Presidency in a 
volatile political atmosphere, with many seeing the European project at an important crossroads. 
Assuming the Presidency at this point in time constitutes a significant challenge to the UK 
government since it will find itself steering the EU in the aftermath of the French and Dutch 
referendum rejections of the Constitutional Treaty, picking up the pieces from the high1profile 
failure to resolve the issue of future financing of the European Union as well as being faced with 
the scheduled opening of membership negotiations with Turkey. 
This is the sixth UK EU Presidency and the second of the current Labour government with the last 
Presidency in 1998. The formal responsibilities of the UK government during this period will be 
threefold. First, that of chairing European Council and Council of Ministers meetings; second, 
representing the Council before the Commission and the European Parliament; and third, acting 
as the EU representative vis1à1vis third states and international organisations. 
 
Key questions arising 
The official agenda for the British Presidency is largely pre1determined in the 200412006 Multi1
annual Strategic Programme, designed for the Irish, Dutch, Luxembourg, UK, Austrian and Finish 
Presidencies, which sets out in broad terms the EU’s work programme for the period of 20041
2006. Moreover, the Operational Programme of the Council, submitted by the then incoming 
Presidencies of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, sets out the policy agenda until 2006 in 
more detail. A selection of these issues is set out in the government’s recently published 
“Priorities for the UK Presidency of the Council” of 23 June 2005. The key areas identified are 
those of “Europe’s role in the world”, more concretely the Doha Developing Agenda, 
Development and Africa, Climate Change, Russia/Ukraine and the Middle East. On the economic 
front, the government pledges to continue the EU’s economic reform agenda, by ensuring 
“better regulation”, taking forward the dossiers of the Service Directorate as well as advancing 
on the issue of the Chemicals Regulation. The third key area identified is that of Security and 
Stability, focussing on Counter Terrorism and Enlargement. A final paragraph pledges to “take 
forward the discussions on future financing”.  The Government’s White Paper “Prospects for the 
EU in 2005: The UK Presidency of the European Union”, published on 30 June 2005, confirms 
these priorities. 
However, despite the relatively high level of detail set out in the Operational Programme, the 
agenda of the UK Presidency will be conditioned by three factors. First, the current political 
climate ensures that the true agenda for this particular Presidency has largely written itself. 
Second, the UK has been at the centre of recent political tensions at the heart of the EU and is 
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historically viewed as one of the more sceptical members of the European Union. Third, the UK 
government will retain a degree of the power of the Presidency on which issues prioritise and 
where to expend political energy. Accordingly, the key questions that arise are: Which are the 
issues likely to dominate the British Presidency, irrespective of the UK government’s preferences? 
What are the UK positions and interests on these issues? Where is it possible to identify 
significant tensions between the UK position and those of other member states, or groups of 
member states, and, in light of these tensions, what are the prospects of making progress on any 
of these issues? Finally, what might one expect from Prime Minister Blair in terms of leadership, 
particularly given his recent speech before the European Parliament on the direction that Europe 
should be heading into? 
1. The unavoidable agenda 
Despite the fact that the agenda for the UK EU Presidency is officially pre1determined, recent 
developments would suggest that three main issues will unavoidably be high up on the list of 
priorities. First, the future of the Constitutional Treaty. Second, the difficulties of agreeing on an 
EU budget for the period of 2007113. Lastly, there is the ongoing question of enlargement.  
a) The Constitutional Treaty 
A number of options for dealing with the Constitutional Treaty confront the EU member states, 
some of which are arguably more viable than others. Resuming ratification is a political non1
option, given the level of dissatisfaction expressed by the people of France and the Netherlands. 
Fully discarding the Treaty and thus reverting back to the Treaty of Nice also seems extremely 
unlikely, since it will be difficult to ignore a series of ideas and improvement measures that exist 
in the form of an (albeit rejected) legal document. A third option, that of dissecting the Treaty 
and incorporating parts of it is arguably more complex than it seems, since any such procedure 
would immediately raise questions as to the scope of such selective implementation. However, 
should parts of the Constitutional Treaty find their way into existing arrangements, they are more 
likely to be issues relating to procedure rather than substance (such as for instance holding 
council meetings in public and increasing levels of subsidiarity). A further option is that of core 
groups of states pressing ahead by taking on board certain aspects of the Treaty. In light of the 
current political climate, this scenario is perhaps more likely to materialise in the medium1to long 
term rather than in the course of the next six months. The British Government has not yet 
expressed a formal view as to which of these options it would like to see pursued. 
The most likely course of action can be found by reading between the lines of the recent Council 
Declaration on the Treaty, which received little media attention due to the parallel failure to 
agree on financing. EU member states are “agreed that the timetable for the ratification in 
different member states will be altered if necessary…”. The text thus allows for a stop or at least 
a slowing down of the ratification process, thus creating some breathing space before making 
any ultimate decision as to how to deal with somewhat odd situation of having a Constitutional 
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Treaty, supported by governments, but still impossible to implement. The Council concludes by 
pledging to “come back to this matter in the first half of 2006”. This is in line with the 
immediate response of the UK government, which, five days after the French “No”, indefinitely 
postponed any UK referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, calling for a “period of reflection” – 
the same words now used in the Council declaration. With the exception of Luxembourg, which 
successfully held its referendum on 10 July, all those countries that had originally planned a 
referendum have followed suit, though parliamentary ratification processes are likely to continue. 
Whereas the Luxembourg “Yes” vote has prompted Prime Minister Juncker to proclaim the 
Treaty to be alive, it is unlikely that this outcome will have any significant effect on policy options 
in this matter in the short to medium term.  
It is worth noting that the formula agreed at the June European Council is that there is no final 
decision made on the future for the Constitutional Treaty. Essentially the declaration has deferred 
debate on the Treaty to a future date. Given the volatility of the current political climate, it is 
difficult to predict whether there will be a return to a debate on the Treaty between now and the 
end of the year. UK Ministers and officials are of the view that the French and Dutch “no” 
should not be seen as rejections of the substance of the Constitutional Treaty; in other words, it 
is not possible to discern a strong demand for a transfer of more powers to Brussels, nor a 
repatriation of those powers. Rather, the general tenor was that of a public disconnect from 
European integration and the aspiration for a more in1touch, transparent European Union 
response to real public concerns. Among policy1makers in the UK there is a general consensus 
that the issue of bringing Europe closer to the people, one of the key mandates the Convention 
was provided with in the Laeken Declaration, was widely ignored. Consequently one priority of 
the UK Presidency has become revitalising the debate on Europe, thus seeking to make a virtue 
of the recent high1profile setbacks of the European project. What seems clear, however, is that 
the UK government is far from having a clear1cut and purposeful strategy on how and where to 
steer the Treaty’s future, having instead opted to kick the document itself out of play. In short, 
the UK government does not seem to be expecting any meaningful developments on this matter 
in the short1term. In light of initial British opposition to some central elements of the 
Constitutional Treaty, notably the establishment of an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, the fact 
that the “period of reflection” falls within the period of the UK Presidency is a relief to the 
government: concrete discussions as to the Treaty’s future might have undermined the UK 
government’s ability to be seen to act as an honest broker in influencing the next practical steps 
relating to this sensitive matter.  
b) Future Financing 
If the question of the future of the Constitutional Treaty has been suspended, thus making it 
unlikely to resurface as a practical issue during the UK Presidency, the question of future 
financing is one which is more likely to unfavourably dominate the UK EU Presidency. The UK 
government made a strategic error by avoiding a root and branch debate on EU financing over 
the last 18 months ago, arguing that the time for a high1profile discussion of the rebate was not 
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when a British referendum on the Constitutional Treaty was pending. Since then, the debate has 
proceeded, culminating in the dramatic failure to agree on a budget towards the end of the 
Luxembourg Presidency. Given that the main controversies relating to the budget have been 
those of agricultural subsidies and the British rebate, the UK government is clearly at the centre 
of the storm.  
In the light of the failure to agree on a budget at the June European Council the UK government 
has been under pressure to address it during the course of its Presidency, especially since the 
new member states have been pushing for a speedy designation of a new budget. Accordingly, 
in its White Paper of 30 June, the government pledges to do “all we can to seek a satisfactory 
outcome by the year end”. One practical consequence of this pledge will be a debate on the 
controversial issue of the British rebate. Faced with the prospect of being outnumbered 24:1 on 
this issue, the government has been inconsistent in its position regarding the negotiability of the 
rebate, and is arguably using the controversy as a lever to put pressure on the French as regards 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The government’s official line is that what lies 
at the heart of the EU’s problem of finances is not the British rebate, but the broader issue of the 
EU’s spending priorities. What is clear is that the UK government will find it difficult to avoid the 
issue during the course of its time as Chair. Accordingly, one likely scenario is that of the UK 
adopting a strategy of conditional engagement: by securing a compromise regarding the rebate 
(essentially freezing the rebate on its current basis and ensuring that new member states will not 
contribute to its financing), as the essential basis for the UK government agreeing on a budget 
for the period of 2007113, which, crucially, would be subject to a mid1term review. Thereby, the 
UK government would satisfy demands for a quick resolution of the budget problem, which risks 
becoming an escalating source of dispute within the EU, whilst at the same time temporarily 
retaining the rebate. Crucially, the UK would secure the future of the rebate tied to a firm 
commitment for reconsideration of the EU’s spending before the crucial date of 2012 for which a 
review of the Common Agricultural Policy has been scheduled.  
c) Enlargement 
Frequent calls for the enlargement process to be continued were among the immediate, and 
most powerful responses to both of the EU’s recent setbacks. In more concrete terms, this 
involves continuing to prepare for the planned accession of Romania and Bulgaria in early 2007, 
potentially opening negotiations with Croatia (pending resolution of the General Gotovina issue), 
and, most controversially, opening negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. To date there 
have been no serious demands to halt the next wave of enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria; 
as far as Croatia is concerned, the opening of negotiations is widely viewed as being a matter for 
Zagreb’s to facilitate by resolving the outstanding ICTY compliance issue.  
The more controversial issue, and thus of particular interest in the context of the UK’s Presidency, 
is that of Turkey. Points of tension can be identified between the British position, which has long 
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since declared Turkish accession to the EU as one of its long1standing foreign policy objectives, 
and that of the German government likely to be elected at a general election in the autumn. The 
leader of the Christian Democrats (CDU), Angela Merkel, takes a critical stance of Turkish 
membership, and has voiced her concern as recently as last month, suggesting that instead of 
full EU membership Turkey might be offered some form of “privileged partnership” (Financial 
Times 3 June 2005). Whereas the current French government is largely in favour of Turkish 
accession, the government is acutely aware of considerable scepticism in the French population. 
Turkish membership thus has the potential to bring out fundamental questions in relation to the 
Union’s future direction, leading on to more general questions relating to when and where 
enlargement should end.  
With the opening of accession negotiations scheduled for early October, halfway through the UK 
Presidency, the issue of Turkey is a likely source of political tension during the Presidency. At the 
same time, however, any such potential for tension is defused by the fact that potential 
accession will not be in the short1to medium term. It remains to be seen whether the UK 
government chooses to use its Presidency to battle for the opening of negotiations or instead, 
given the sensitivities and the potential for conflict with Germany, chooses to pass the issue on 
to future Presidencies. Another open question is the extent to which any new incoming German 
government decides to push the issue hard especially with prospective French Presidential 
elections in 2007 which could bring to power a figure also categorically opposed to Turkish 
accession. As for the UK Presidency, it is worth pointing out that negotiations with Turkey were 
not mentioned in the Prime Minister’s speech to the European Parliament, although it does find 
a brief mentioning in the “Priorities for the UK Presidency of the Council” document that 
accompanied the speech. In short, the prominence of the issue over the next six months is 
difficult to predict with any certainty. However, it is unlikely that it will prove to be one that 
could derail or dominate the entirety of the UK’s six months in the chair. 
Finally, following the terrorist attacks on the London transport system on July 7, the issue of EU–
wide co1operation on counter1terrorism measures will inevitably gain prominence in the months 
ahead. Measures designed to facilitate identification, arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects 
are, however, generally considered an issue to be addressed by coordinated national means 
rather than through EU structures. This approach was set out in the Government’s White Paper, 
published prior to the bombings, in which it describes the role of the EU in counter terrorism1
activities as one of “supporting member states”. At the same time, the value of European co1
operation, notably in relation to the sharing of intelligence, is widely acknowledged by UK 
politicians: both Prime Minister Tony Blair and Home Secretary Charles Clarke, in their 
statements following the attacks, stressed the importance of working with other EU member 
states in order to prevent further incidents. The Home Secretary has scheduled an emergency 
meeting of EU interior ministers for Wednesday 13 July. Key issues will be those outlined in the 
Government’s White Paper of 30 June, namely progress on the European Evidence Warrant, as 
well as retaining data generated by telecommunications traffic (specifically telephone and email 
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records). The latter point has been the object of disagreement among EU member states in the 
past, with diverging views on the length of time such data should be stored. Other issues for 
both the emergency meeting of 13 July as well as the course of the UK Presidency will be a 
common database for commercial transactions of explosives and weapons, transmission of data 
to Interpol in the case of lost or stolen passports, sharing passenger flight information and 
common security features for ID cards.  
2.  Prospects 
Of the three burning issues around which the agenda for the UK EU Presidency is currently 
writing itself, two have arguably been defused: the short1term future of the Constitutional Treaty 
has been resolved; the principle of enlargement is not seriously being questioned and its more 
sensitive aspects are too far away to weigh all too heavily in the next six months. As for future 
financing, the prospects for a deal are strong, even if its content is impossible to predict with 
certainty. What remains are, first, the mundane, routine issues, notably carrying on with the 
economic reform and the Lisbon agenda, as well as, second, a broad, all1pervading problem, 
repeatedly stressed by the Prime Minister in his speech to the European Parliament on 23 June, 
namely the forgotten mandate of the Laeken Declaration: bringing the EU closer to its citizens.  
As for the former, they are reflected in the government’s official priorities of 23 June and 
represent the core activities that drive the EU forward (reducing barriers to trade and free 
movement, better regulation, research and innovation, promoting employment). Despite the 
current debate on the future of the EU, it is unlikely that the technical matters of further 
economic integration will be halted, with the one possible exception of the Services Directive, 
which came to be seen by many as the incarnation of “liberal Europe”, particular among French 
voters in the run1up to the referendum of 29 May. The UK government has recently stressed the 
importance of taking forward the dossier, describing it as “an opportunity to make one of the 
biggest improvements to the Single Market since its original creation” but it is unclear to what 
extent to government will insist on its conclusion.  
The more immediate question, then, and arguably one by which to judge the success of the UK 
Presidency, is its ability to put into action its intentions to re1engage European Citizens and 
provide for new leadership – two issues which the Prime Minister, members of the cabinet and 
senior officials have raised and continue to stress, so much so that the issue was at the heart of 
the Prime Minister’s speech to the EP on 23 June. In it, the Prime Minister arguably offered a 
flavour of the prospective tone of any debate on the future of Europe. Rejecting a polarisation of 
the debate between a “free market Europe” and a “social Europe”, the Prime Minister 
proceeded to list the various domestic policies in the UK designed to improve social justice – a 
term which incidentally found its way into the government’s publication of its priorities for the 
strategy referred to above. In other words, the British are keen to take issue with the common 
perception of the UK as intent upon pursuing a system of “Anglo1Saxon capitalism”, 
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diametrically opposed to “social1democratic Europe”. By arguing that the key issues are those of 
“modernisation” and “leadership”, the UK has arguably raised the stakes for its Presidency, 
suggesting that the UK has much to offer in respect to both. This can be understood as a direct 
criticism of social and economic model found in other large EU member states – notably 
Germany, France and Spain. Read in the light of the UK’s currently strong economic prospects as 
well as the weakened position of President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder, this rhetoric is 
perhaps the sharpest indication yet of the UK’s aspiration to take on a leadership role in the next 
six months.  
One open question is how the UK government will interpret the link between “re1engagement of 
citizens” on the one hand and “leadership” on the other. If the UK government is serious in its 
intention to both lead and listen, it will arguably have to listen first. What the precise measures 
designed to promote reconnection and provide leadership will be therefore remains to be seen. It 
is, however, unlikely that the UK Presidency will see a stream of new policy initiatives in either 
these or other areas. Whereas for many Blair’s new and self1assumed role as a promoter of 
change in Europe suggests some form of hyper1activity, UK officials have privately made it clear 
that the current focus is on implementation of existing legislation, regarded by Whitehall as one 
of the most challenging problems the EU faces. In other words, whereas recent events have had 
a heavy impact on the UK’s ambitions for its Presidency, denoting a shift away from a low1key, 
smooth implementation of the existing agenda, towards a more general debate on the future of 
the EU, it is unlikely that the UK in its term of office will seek to introduce new substantive 
legislation. This is in line with the Prime Minister’s address to the EP, which was arguably more 
visionary in style and tone than in actual substance, mainly revisiting and emphasising issues 
which have troubled the EU for considerably longer than since the day when the French said 
“Non”. 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The UK government’s recent preference for a full1blown debate on the future of the EU, rather 
than “business as usual”, is based on the analysis that the popular rejection of the Treaty on the 
continent was caused by two main factors. One is a disconnect between Europe and its citizens. 
A second factor is that of the deeper questions on Europe’s position in a globalised world and 
the anxieties, insecurities and new challenges to which globalisation gives rise. The UK 
government clearly considers that it has a strong answer to the latter problem: economic 
liberalisation and flexible labour markets. In this respect, the challenge of the UK EU Presidency 
is to both initiate and lead the debate and make progress towards winning the argument in 
favour of a what is often described as a more Anglo1Saxon economic model for Europe. Whereas 
this is a considerable and unenviable task, rendered more difficult by personal animosities 
between current EU leaders, the UK’s positive economic outlook invests the UK government with 
a significant degree of credibility and authority, making it unlikely that the UK Prime Minister, 
and other Ministers, will let the opportunity to influence the opening stages of any such debate 
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slip by. In short, the challenge for the government seems to be one of choosing the right tone 
and tactics rather than one of policy substance. 
It is in relation to the question of reconnecting Europe to the people, where the government’s 
prospects for providing strong leadership are more doubtful. The UK has been unable to portray 
an honest, let alone positive image of the European Union to the British people, with Ministers 
constantly on the defensive when attempting to justify EU policies and their impact on the UK. 
Such uncertainty is not the best starting point to provide European1wide leadership. In this 
respect, the UK government will need to avoid its Presidency being confined to a conversation 
between the respective EU governments whilst ignoring the people and fearing the media. There 
are, however, a number of ways the UK government can use its six months in the chair to 
provide for both leadership and focus, thus highlighting the EU’s importance and giving it a more 
easily discernible sense of purpose. 
The first way of providing for popular engagement in EU affairs, both in the UK and abroad, is 
that of highlighting the potential impact EU action might have on issues that are currently highly 
present in public consciousness: third world poverty and climate change. Both are stated 
priorities for the UK’s parallel chairmanship of the G8 and in light of high1profile campaigning 
the expectations surrounding the outcome of the Gleneagles summit of July 7 are high. Given 
that the UK’s objectives on both issues are arguably closer to those of other EU member states 
than to those of the US, a common European approach, lead and co1ordinated by the UK Prime 
Minister, could go far in creating a higher level of awareness, and thus more support, for the 
European project in general. Thus far the UK government has shown little interest in taking such 
an approach. At present there is something of a disconnect between the UK’s G18 agenda and 
the policies that it seeks to pursue during its EU Presidency. 
A second, but related, opportunity to present a changing European Union to a sceptical public 
will be the European Council scheduled for October 2005. This European Council could be styled 
as a more open and reflective meeting of Heads of State and Government. Under the UK 
Presidency the summit could be more transparent than is usual with such gatherings and 
Europe’s leaders could grant open access for media coverage of discussions that would focus on 
substantive issues and with an agenda focused on the issues that seemed to be the concern of 
publics during the referendum campaign. This would send a powerful signal that after the 
debacle of the June European Council issues of direct concern to publics such as economic well1
being are the issues that Europe’s leaders are directly addressing. The extent to which the UK 
government will be able to produce satisfactory outcomes on issues will depend on the good will 
of other member states being persuaded that such a meeting would be substantive as well as 
symbolic. It would, however, prove an opportunity for the UK government to be seen to take a 
new approach in the way European Councils are conducted. This may not be the deep far 
reaching debate that the UK government wishes to see conducted on the future of the EU but it 
would place Britain in the position of having contributed to an EU that seriously embarks on a 
process of re1connecting with publics. 
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The London bombings taking place while the UK government holds the Presidency of the EU will, 
inevitably, impact upon the tone and tenor of UK politicians during the second half of 2005. The 
UK government will seek to identify measures that could enhance counter1terrorism through 
working together with the other EU member states. Such measures will not be both defined and 
fully implemented during the UK term as Council President1in1office and will consequently be on 
the agenda for the successor Presidency. 
